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A TRULY LEVEL PLAYING FIELD FOR 
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS: IMPROVING 
TIIE OECD CONVENTION ON 
COMBATING BRIBERY USING CLEAR 
STANDARDS 
CHRISTOPHER K. CARLBERG* 
Abstract: Combating bribery in international business has become 
increasingly important in a global economic environment in which 
deregulation and privatization are popular trends. The Organisation for 
Economic Co-Operation and Development's (OECD's) Convention on 
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions is an important step towards leveling the playing field for 
foreign companies competing for business abroad. However, this Note 
concludes that, in order to improve the uniform application of the 
Convention, the Convention's signatory parties should: (1) adopt a 
minimum five-year statute of limitations requirement; (2) adopt a five-
year maximum term of imprisonment for natural persons convicted of 
bribery; and (3) impose a fine of not less than $175,000 U.S. dollars 
(USD) for individuals convicted of bribery. 
INTRODUCTION 
Bribery in the conduct of international business has been linked 
to a host of challenging international problems: causing long-term 
damage to economic development and the growth of democratic and 
transparent institutions, weakening global security, and contributing 
to worldwide poverty.1 At a minimum, bribery of foreign officials dis-
torts the competitive forces of market economies.2 The bribery of 
* Chistopher K. Carlberg is an Executive Editor of the Boston College International & 
Comparative Law Review . 
1 See Andrea Goldbarg, Note, The Forei!fU Corrupt Practices Act and Structural Corruption, 
18 B.U. INT'L LJ. 273, 274 (2000); THE WoRLD BANK GROUP, ANn-CoRRUPTION KNowL-
EDGE CENTER: HELPING COUNTRIES REDUCE CORRUPTION, at http:/ /wwwl.worldbank.org/ 
publicsector /anticorrupt/helping.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2002). 
2 See Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International 
Business Transactions and related Documents, Dec. 17, 1997, pmbl. [hereinafter OECD 
Convention]; see generally THE WoRLD BANK GROUP, supra note 1; S. REP. No. 105-277, at 2 
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public officials has become increasingly important for a global eco-
nomic environment in which deregulation and privatization are 
popular trends.3 
The Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development 
(OECD) has attempted to level the playing field for foreign compa-
nies competing for business outside their home country by adopting 
the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions (the Convention) and the 1997 
Revised Recommendation of the Council on Combating Bribery in 
International Business Transactions (the Recommendation). 4 While 
these documents have provided a strong foundation for a coordinated 
effort to curb the economic impact of bribery in international busi-
ness, the uniform and effective implementation of these documents is 
a serious, if not insurmountable, challenge.5 This Note addresses the 
numerous challenges associated with the effective implementation of 
the OECD Convention and suggests that clearer standards for the 
statute of limitations and sanction provisions should be adopted in 
order to improve the uniform application of the Convention's provi-
sions. 
Part I of this Note surveys the history and origins of the OECD 
Convention, paying particular attention to the influence of the U.S. 
and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). Part II outlines the 
basic requirements of the Convention and details the Convention's 
current liability and sanction provisions. Part III explains the Conven-
tion's enforcement and evaluation mechanisms and describes the 
Phase 1 and Phase 2 evaluation programs. Finally, Part IV of this Note 
illustrates the problems with the multilateral application of the Con-
vention and advocates for the adoption of a minimum five-year statute 
(1998), available at http:/ /www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/senatel.htm (last visited 
Nov. 6, 2002) [hereinafter SENATE REPORT]. 
3 See Wayne Hamra, Bribery in International Business Transactions and the OECD Conven-
tion: Benefits and Limitations, Bus. EcoN., Oct. 1, 2000, available at 2000 WL 15294332; see 
generally Doing Welll!y Doing Good, THE EcoNOMIST, Apr. 22, 2000 (U.S. ed.), available at 
2000 WL 8141686. 
4 Lisa Miller, Note, No More "This For That"7 The Effect of the OECD Convention on Combat-
ing Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, 8 CARDOZO J. IN'r'L 
& COMP. L. 139, 140 (2000). 
5 A number of other international organizations are also involved in the effort to curb 
international bribery, including the United Nations, the World Bank, the International 
Monetary Fund, the International Chamber of Commerce, the World Trade Organization, 
the Organization of American States, the Council of Europe and the European Union. See 
OECD Convention, supra note 2, at pmbl.; Alejandro Posadas, Combating Corruption Under 
International Law, 10 DuKEJ. CoMP. & INT'L L. 345, 346 (2000). 
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of limitations requirement, a five-year maximum term of imprison-
ment for natural persons convicted of bribery, and the possibility of 
imposing a fine of $175,000 U.S. Dollars (USD) upon legal persons 
convicted of bribery. 
·I. HISTORY AND ORIGINS OF THE OECD CONVENTION 
The OECD is a group of thirty countries sharing a commitment 
to democratic government and the market economy.6 Member coun-
tries are mostly large, industrialized nations.7 The OECD's primary 
focus is building strong economies in its member countries by im-
proving efficiency, honing market systems, and expanding free trade.8 
Given these objectives, it is not surprising that the OECD has recently 
dedicated its effort to combating bribery and corruption in interna-
tional business transactions, which can undermine good governance 
and economic development, and distort international competitive 
conditions.9 
The fight against international bribery and corruption began in 
the U.S. in the late 1970's.l0 Against the backdrop of the numerous 
scandals uncovered by the Watergate hearings, investigators found 
many instances of U.S. companies bribing public officials in foreign 
countries.ll In total, over 400 companies, including seventeen "For-
tune 500" companies, admitted to paying bribes of some sort while 
transacting international business.12 In 1977, Congress responded to 
these improprieties by passing the FCPA, which had two main tenets: 
accounting safeguards and anti-bribery provisions.13 The accounting 
6 ORGANISATION FOR EcoNOMIC Co-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, ABouT OECD, at 
http:/ /www.oecd.org/EN/about/O,EN-about-O-nodirectorate-no-no-no-O,OO.html (last 
visited Nov. 6, 2002) [hereinafter ABouTOECD]. 
7 See ORGANISATION FOR EcoNOMIC Co-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, OECD, MEM-
BER COUNTRIES, at http:/ /www.oecd.org/oecd/EN/countrylist/O,EN-countrylist-O-nodi-
rectorate-no-no-159-0,00.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2002) [hereinafter OECD MEMBER 
COUNTRIES]. 
8 See ORGANISATION FOR EcoNOMIC Co-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, HIS'IURY OF 
THE OECD, at http:/ /www.oecd.org/EN/document/O,EN-document-O-nodirectorate-
no21-9347-0,00.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2002) [hereinafter HISWRY OF THE OECD]. 
9 See OECD Convention, supra note 2, at pmbl. 
10 See Goldbarg, supra note 1, at 276. 
II See id.; Posadas, supra note 5, at 348-50. 
12 See Goldbarg, supra note 1, at 276. In a particularly egregious case, Lockheed's Vice-
Chairman admitted at a congressional hearing that the company had paid $1.1 million to 
a "high government official of the Netherlands," who was later discovered to be Prince 
Bernhard, the husband of Queen Juliana. See Posadas, supra note 5, at 364. 
13 /d.; Kari Lynn Diersen, Foreip;n Corrupt Practices Act, 36 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 753, 755-56 
(1999). 
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safeguards of the FCPA required companies to establish internal ac-
counting controls to prevent the covering-up of improper transac-
tions.l4 The anti-bribery provisions made it illegal to bribe a foreign 
official for the purpose of obtaining or retaining business or securing 
any improper advantage,l5 
Following the passage of the FCPA, U.S. businesses operated at a 
disadvantage, relative to foreign competitors who continued to pay 
bribes without fear of penalty, in the competition for international 
business.l6 By 1988, Congress had directed the Executive Branch to 
seek a level playing field for U.S. businesses by encouraging U.S. trad-
ing partners to enact legislation similar to the FCPA.l' Consequently, 
in 1994, the OECD began officially coordinating an effort to combat 
the bribery of foreign public officials in international business trans-
actions .Is Thirty-four countries, including twenty-nine OECD mem-
ber countries and five non-member countries, signed the Convention 
on December 17, 1997,19 The Convention entered into force on Feb-
ruary 15, 1999 with the chief aim of leveling the playing field for 
companies competing for business outside their home countries.20 
While many other organizations have addressed the problems of 
international corruption and bribery, the OECD Convention is one of 
the most recent and comprehensive global initiatives.21 Not surpris-
14 SeeGoldbarg, supra note 1, at 276; Diersen, supra note 13, at 755-56. 
15 SeeGoldbarg, supra note 1, at 276; Diersen, supra note 13, at 758. 
16 SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 2; seeGoldbarg, supra note 1, at 278. 
17 SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 2. 
1s Miller, supra note 4, at 139. 
19 Jd.; ORGANISATION FOR EcoNOMIC Co-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, FIGHTING 
BRIBERY AND CoRRUPTION: OECD CoNVENTION, at http:/ /www.oecd.org/EN/about/ 
O,EN-about-86-nodirectorate-no-no-no-31,00.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2002) [hereinafter 
FIGHTING BRIBERY AND CORRUPTION]. The twenty-nine member countries signing the 
Convention included: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, japan, Korea, Luxem-
bourg, Mexico, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, The Slovak 
Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United States. 
The five non-member countries signing the convention were Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, 
Chile, and Slovenia. 
20 Miller, supra note 4, at 139-40; see FIGHTING BRIBERY AND CORRUPTION, supra note 
19. 
21 See Miller, supra note 4, at 139; ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC Co-OPERATION AND 
DEVELOPMENT, ABOUT INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVES, at http:/ /www.oecd.org/oecd/pages/ 
home/ displaygeneral/0,3380,EN-about-87-nodirectorate-no-no-no-31,FF.html (last visited 
Nov. 8, 2002) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVES]; ORGANISATION FOR EcoNOMIC 
Co-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, GLOBAL INIATITVES, http:/ /www.oecd.org/oecd/ 
pages/home/ displaygeneral/0,3380,EN-documen t-87-nodirectorate-no-no-30613-31,00. 
html (last visited Nov. 8, 2002) [hereinafter GLOBAL INITATIVES]. 
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ingly, given the strong influence of the United States, the OECD Con-
vention incorporates many aspects of the FCPA.22 The Convention is 
only concerned with "active" corruption or bribery-the offense 
committed by the person who promises or gives the bribe, rather than 
the individual who receives the bribe.23 To this end, the Convention 
seeks functional equivalence among the measures taken by signatory 
countries to sanction bribery of foreign public officials, without re-
quiring complete uniformity or changes in fundamental principles of 
a state's legal system.24 While this approach makes it easier for coun-
tries to initially adopt the Convention, it makes the even-handed ap-
plication of the Convention's principles between nations very chal-
lenging, if not impossible. 25 
II. BASIC REQUIREMENTS OF THE CONVENTION 
The Convention requires signatory countries to establish crimi-
nal liability for the "active bribery" of foreign public officials, refer-
ring to the "offense committed by the person who promises or gives 
the bribe," rather than the offense of the official accepting a bribe.26 
Article 1 of the Convention requires countries to criminalize the of-
fering, promising, or giving of a bribe, either directly or through an 
intermediary, to a foreign public official in order to gain an improper 
advantage in the conduct of international business.27 Signatory coun-
tries must also extend criminal liability to those who incite, aid, abet 
or authorize the bribery of a foreign public official.28 
22 See Posadas, supra note 5, at 383-84. 
25 See OECD Convention, supra note 2, at cmts., para. I. 
24 See id. at para. 2. 
25 See Posadas, supra note 5, at 379-80. 
26 SeeOECD Convention, supra note 2, at cmts., para. I; Miller, supra note 4, at 141. 
27 See id. at art. I. Article I, Paragraph I states: "Each Party shall take measures as may 
be necessary to establish that it is a criminal offence under its law for any person inten-
tionally to offer, promise or give any undue pecuniary or other advantage, whether directly 
or through intermediaries, to a foreign public official, for that official or for a third party, 
in order that the official act or refrain from acting in relation to the performance of 
official duties, in order to obtain or retain business or other improper advantage in the 
conduct of international business." 
28 See id. at art. I; Miller, supra note 4, at 14I-42. Article I, Paragraph 2 states: "Each 
Party shall take any measures necessary to establish that complicity in, including incite-
ment, aiding and abetting, or authorisatinn of an act of bribery of a foreign public official 
shall be a criminal offence. Attempt and conspiracy to bribe a foreign public official shall 
be criminal offences to the same extent as attempt and conspiracy to bribe a public official 
of that Party." 
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Those found guilty of bribing or being involved in the bribery of 
a foreign public official (including "legal persons," if applicable under 
Article 2 of the Convention) must be punished in accordance with the 
principles of Article 3.29 Article 3 requires that "[t]he bribery of a for-
eign public official shall be punishable by effective, proportionate and 
dissuasive criminal penalties ... comparable to that applicable to the 
bribery of the [country's] own public officials .... "3° For individuals, 
such punishment must "include deprivation of liberty sufficient to 
enable effective mutual legal assistance and extradition. "3l For legal 
persons to whom criminal liability does not extend, signatory coun-
tries must "ensure that legal persons shall be subject to effective, pro-
portionate and dissuasive non-criminal sanctions, including monetary 
fines, for bribery of foreign public officials. "32 In addition, signatory 
countries must seize and confiscate bribes, including the proceeds 
and property value corresponding to the bribery of foreign public 
officials, or impose monetary sanctions with similar effects.33 
III. THE CoNVENTION's EVALUATION MECHANISMS 
Article 12 of the Convention calls for the OECD Working Group 
on Bribery in International Business Transactions (Working Group) 
to carry out a program of systematic follow-up to monitor and pro-
mote the full implementation of the Convention.34 Monitoring of the 
implementation of the Convention is divided into two phases.35 Phase 
I, which began in April 1999 and was completed in late 2002, was 
29 See OECD Convention, supra note 2, at art. 3. In addition, liability for "legal persons" 
must be established in accordance with Article 2: "Each Party shall take such measures as 
may be necessary, in accordance with its legal principles, to establish the liability of legal 
persons for the bribery of a foreign public official." However, if a country's legal system 
does not extend criminal responsibility to legal persons, the country is not required to 
establish criminal liability for legal persons bribing foreign public officials. See id. at cmts., 
para. 20. 
!10 See id. at art. 3. 
31 &eid. 
32 See OECD Convention, supra note 2, at art. 3, para 2. Other non-criminal sanctions 
may include, "exclusion from entitlement to public benefits or aid; temporary or perma-
nent disqualification from participation in public procurement or from the practice of 
other commercial activities; placing under judicial supervision; and a judicial winding-up 
order." See id.. · 
33 See id at art. 3 para 3. 
M See id. at art. 12. 
!15 See ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC Co-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, BRIBERY 
CONVENTION: PROCEDURE OF SELF· AND MUTUAL EVALUATION, at http:/ /www.oecd.org/ 
oecd/pages/home/displaygenerai/0,3380,EN-document-88-nodirectorate-no-no-7218-
31,00.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2002) [hereinafter PHASE 1]. 
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primarily aimed at "evaluat[ing] whether the legal texts through 
which participants have implemented the Convention meet the stan-
dard set by the Convention as well as initial actions to implement the 
Recommendation. It provided an opportunity for countries to learn 
from the experiences and approaches of others. "36 The Phase 1 peer 
evaluations were "vertical," or based on examinations country-by-
country.37 These initial evaluations consisted of each country's replies 
to a Working Group questionnaire, consultation between the exam-
ined country's officials and the Working Group, and adoption and 
publication of a report on the examined country's performance.3s 
Thus far, the Working Group has reviewed the implementing legisla-
tion of all signatory countries through Phase 1 evaluations.39 
Phase 2 evaluations will study the structures put in place to en-
force the laws and rules implementing the Convention and will assess 
their application in practice. 40 This second round of evaluations will 
include "horizontal" analysis or country-to-country comparisons.41 
The focus of Phase 2 evaluations will also be broader and include the 
non-criminal aspects of the 1997 Revised Recommendation dealing 
with the tax deductibility of bribes.42 Phase 2 evaluations began at the 
end of 2001 and will continue through 2005.43 
Like Phase 1, the Phase 2 evaluations will include country replies 
to a common questionnaire, consultation between the examined 
country's officials and the Working Group, and evaluative reports on 
each country's performance.44 However, Phase 2 will also include two 
to three day on-site visits to each country examined, providing an ef-
fective way to obtain information on enforcement and prosecution.45 
36 /d.; see ORGANISATION FOR EcoNOMIC Co-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, BRIBERY 
CONVENTION: PROCEDURE OF SELF- AND MUTUAL EVALUATION, PHASE 2, at http://www. 
oecd.org/ oecd/ pages/home/ displaygeneral/ 0,3380,EN-documen t-88-nodirectorate-no-
no- 7223-31 ,OO.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2002) [hereinafter PHASE 2]. 
37 See PHASE I, supra note 35. 
38 Seeid. 
39 ORGANISATION FOR EcoNOMIC Co-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, ABoUT THE 
OECD CoNVENTION AND OTHER INSTRUMENTS, at http:/ /www.oecd.org/oecd/pages/ 
home/ displaygenerai/0,3380,EN-about-88-nodirectorate-no-no-no-31 ,FF.html (last visited 
Nov. 8, 2002) [hereinafter OECD CoNVENTION AND OTHER INSTRUMENTS]. 
40 See PHASE 2, supra note 36. 
41 See id. 
42 See id. 
43 See id. 
44 See id. 
45 See PHASE 2, supra note 36; ORGANISATION FOR EcoNOMIC Co-OPERATION AND DE-
VELOPMENT, BRIBERY CONVENTION: PROCEDURE OF SELF- AND MUTUAL EVALUATION foR 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONVENTION AND THE REVISED RECOMMENDATION-PHASE 2: 
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The on-site visits also offer the possibility of meetings with magistrates, 
police, tax officials, and other authorities responsible for applying the 
law, as well as representatives from the private sector or civil society to 
ascertain their views.46 The Phase 2 on-site evaluations will be con-
ducted by one or two members of the Secretariat and up to three ex-
perts from each lead examining country chosen in consultation with 
the country examined.47 
While the Convention's evaluation mechanisms profess and 
demonstrate a strong commitment to the full implementation of the 
Convention through a rigorous and systematic program of multilat-
eral monitoring and evaluation,48 there are a number of systemic 
problems that the Convention does not adequately address. 
IV. THE PROBLEMS OF MULTILATERAL ENFORCEMENT 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MORE 
UNIFORM CoMPLIANCE 
With the Phase 1 evaluations complete, the Working Group has 
already reviewed and reported on all countries' compliance with the 
Convention and Recommendation.49 Taken together, the definition of 
the offense of bribing a foreign public official (Article 1) and the as-
sociated sanctions (Article 3) were intended to create an effective de-
terrent to the bribery of foreign public officials by combining threats 
of criminal prosecution, monetary sanctions, seizure of bribes or asso-
ciated property, as well as the public stigma from a conviction for 
bribery.5° Yet, one of the chief failings of the Convention is that it 
does not set forth concrete standards to which signatory countries will 
be held.51 In implementing the Convention, member countries can 
ANNEX, ThRMS OF REFERENCE FOR ON-SITE VISITS, at http:/ /www.oecd.org/pdf/ 
M00007000/M00007237.pdf (last visited Nov. 8, 2002) [hereinafter ON-SITE VISITS]. 
46 See PHASE 2, supra note 36; ON-SITE VISITS, supra note 45. 
47 The composition of the on-site evaluation team shall ensure adequate expertise in 
the areas to be examined. Lead examiners shall be chosen from countries for which a 
Phase 1 evaluation has been completed by the Working Group. ON-SITE VISITS, supra note 
45. 
48 See OECD Convention, supra note 2, at art. 12 & cmts., para. 34. 
49 See OECD CoNVENTION AND OTIIER INSTRUMENTS, supra note 39; PHASE 1, supra 
note 35. 
50 See OECD Convention, supra note 2, at arts. 1, 3; Miller, supra note 4, at 144. 
51 A number of other shortcomings of the Convention have also been identified. The 
Convention has been criticized for not addressing "passive bribery" and allowing small 
"facilitation payments." See Miller, supra note 4, at 141, 143. Others have pointed out that 
the Convention fails to address illegal contributions and payments to foreign political par-
ties and candidates, and may not apply to bribing family members of foreign public 
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pass legislation at different ends of a rather broad spectrum as great 
deference is given to individual countries' legal systems.52 Member 
countries are not required to incorporate any precise terms or lan-
guage when drafting legislation, which has led to some countries en-
acting more stringent or lenient standards than others.53 While this 
flexible framework undoubtedly was helpful in gaining the ascension 
of a large number and variety of countries,54 it also presents a chal-
lenge to the uniform implementation and application of the Conven-
tion. 
In fact, the Phase 1 reports have identified numerous problems 
such as inadequacies in the definitions of "foreign public officials," 
missing elements of the offense of bribing a public foreign official, 
and insufficient liability for legal persons.55 The Working Group has 
informed a number of signatory countries that these definitional 
deficiencies have prevented their successful implementation of the 
Convention.56 For instance, the Working Group determined that Ar-
gentina had not satisfied the requirements of the Convention because 
it had not criminalized the bribery of agents or representatives of in-
ternational organizations and public officials of organized foreign 
areas or entities.57 While these definitional deficiencies can easily be 
officials. See Posadas, supra note 5, at 381. While there are clearly a number of areas in 
which the Convention can be improved, this Note focuses on two areas where stricter stan-
dards can be utilized in order to aid the uniform implementation of the Convention. 
52 See Miller, supra note 4, at 142; OECD Convention, supra note 2, at cmts. para. 2. 
53 See id. In fact, the intention of the Convention and Article 1 is to establish a lowest 
common denominator for the implementation or interpretation measures, if any, to be 
taken by the signatories. Posadas, mpra note 5, at 386. 
54 See generally OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions: Ratification Status, at http:/ /www.oecd.org/pdf/ 
M00017000/M00017037.pdf (last visited Nov. 8, 2002) [hereinafter Ratification Status]. 
55 See, e.g., ORGANISATION FOR EcONOMIC Co-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, BEL-
GIUM: REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CoNVENTION AND 1997 RECOMMENDATION 20, 
at http:/ /www.oecd.org/pdf/M00007000/M00007820.pdf (last visited Nov. 8, 2002); OR-
GANISATION FOR ECONOMIC Co-OPERKOON AND DEVELOPMENT, ARGENTINA: REVIEW OF 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONVENTION AND 1997 RECOMMENDATION 27, at http://www. 
oecd.org/pdf/M00007000/M00007183.pdf (last visited Nov. 8, 2002) [hereinafter ARGEN-
TINA CoUNTRY REPORT]; ORGANISATION FOR EcoNOMIC CO-OPERA'OON AND DEVELOP-
MENT, BULGARIA: REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONVENTION AND 1997 REcoM-
MENDA'OON 19, at http:/ /www.oecd.org/pdf/M00007000/M00007825.pdf (last visited Nov. 
8, 2002). 
56 See ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, REPORT BY 
THE CIME: IMPLEMENTATION OF 'OlE CoNVENTION ON BRIBERY IN INTERNATIONAL Busi-
NESS TRANSACTIONS AND THE 1997 REVISED RECOMMENDA'OONS 3 (May 2001), at 
http:/ /www.oecd.org/pdf/M00007000/M00007214.pdf (last visited Nov. 8, 2002) [herein-
after IMPLEMENTA'OON OF THE CONVENTION]. 
57 See ARGENTINA CouNTRY REPORT, supra note 55, at 27. 
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identified and remedied, there are other inconsistencies that require 
unilateral action. In order to ensure that the Convention is imple-
mented in a way that honors its aim of achieving functional equiva-
lence among the measures taken by member countries,58 there are 
two particular areas in which more concrete standards should be 
adopted in order to facilitate the uniform application of the Conven-
tion. 
A. Adopting a Minimum Five-year Statute of Limitations Standard 
To begin with, a more precise standard should be utilized in 
defining the statute of limitations requirement. Article 6 of the Con-
vention requires that any statute of limitations applicable to the of-
fense of bribing a foreign public official, "shall allow an adequate pe-
riod of time for the investigation and prosecution of this offence. "59 
Signatory countries are left to decide what constitutes an "adequate 
period of time" with no further guidance from the text or Commen-
taries of the Convention.60 The Working Group has noted in several 
Phase 1 country reports that the question of what length statute of 
limitations is required by the Convention is a general problem calling 
for a comparative analysis in Phase 2.61 
However, the Working Group has expressed concern that the 
three-year statutes of limitations enacted by a number of countries, 
such as France, Hungary, Japan, and the Slovak Republic, may not 
provide an adequate period of time for the investigation and prosecu-
58 SeeOECD Convention, supra note 2, at cmts. para. 2. 
59 !d. at art. 6. 
60 See id. at art. 6 & cmts., para. 27-28. 
61 See ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC Co-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, DENMARK: 
REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONVENTION AND 1997 REcoMMENDATION 27, at 
http:/ /www.oecd.org/pdf/M00007000/M0000720l.pdf (last visited Nov. 8, 2002) [herein-
after DENMARK CoUNTRY REPORT]; ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC Co-OPERATION AND 
DEVELOPMENT, FRANCE: REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONVENTION AND 1997 REc-
OMMENDATION 31, at http:/ /www.oecd.org/pdf/M00007000/M00007204.pdf (last visited 
Nov. 8, 2002) (hereinafter FRANCE COUNTRY REPORT]; ORGANISATION FOR EcoNOMIC Co-
OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, GERMANY: REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONVEN-
TION AND 1997 RECOMMENDATION 19, at http:/ /www.oecd.org/pdf/M00007000/ 
M00007830.pdf (last visited Nov. 8, 2002); ORGANISATION FOR EcoNOMIC Co-OPERATION 
AND DEVELOPMENT, HUNGARY: REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CoNVENTION AND 
1997 RECOMMENDATION 20, at http:/ /www.oecd.org/pdf/M00007000/M00007833.pdf 
(last visited Nov. 8, 2002) (hereinafter HUNGARY COUNTRY REPORT]; ORGANISATION FOR 
ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, SLOVAK REPUBLIC: REVIEW OF IMPLEMEN-
TATION OF THE CoNVENTION AND 1997 RECOMMENDATION 23, at http:/ /www.oecd. 
org/pdf/M00007000/M0000784l.pdf (last visited Nov. 8, 2002) [hereinafter SLOVAK RE-
PUBLIC COUNTRY REPORT]. 
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tion of bribery of a foreign public official.62 Australia, Canada, and 
the United Kingdom, on the other hand, have no time limitation on 
the prosecution of either natural or legal persons.63 In particular, the 
Working Group expressed serious doubts about the effectiveness of 
Denmark's two-year statute of limitations for legal persons.64 Given 
the secretive nature of acts of corruption, offenses are often not dis-
covered until several years after being committed.65 Thus, the Work-
ing Group is concerned that shorter statutes of limitations will make 
the coherent and effective implementation of the Convention's sanc-
tions difficult and may also pose an obstacle to the provision of mu-
tual legal assistance.66 
While the Working Group has suggested that the statute of limita-
tions issue should be reevaluated in Phase 2, the same dormant na-
ture of bribery offenses that makes necessary a longer statute of limi-
tations may also limit the effectiveness of Phase 2 comparative 
62 See FRANCE CouNTRY REPORT, supra note 61, at 31; HuNGARY CoUNTRY REPORT, su-
pra note 61, at 20; ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, jA-
PAN: REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONVENTION AND 1997 RECOMMENDATION 27, at 
http:/ /www.oecd.org/pdf/M00007000/M00007835.pdf (last visited Nov. 8, 2002) [herein-
after jAPAN CoUNTRY REPORT); SLOVAK REPUBLIC COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 61, at 23. 
In addition, Mexico's statute of limitation is three years where the offense is punishable by 
between two months and two years of imprisonment but the statute of limitations is eight 
years where the offense is punishable by between two and fourteen years of imprisonment. 
Moreover, the Mexico legislation provides for the doubling of the limitations period where 
the suspect is abroad and due to his/her absence it is not possible to prepare the pre-trial 
investigation, conclude a process or execute a sanction. See ORGANISATION FOR EcoNOMIC 
Co-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, MEXICO: REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CoN-
VENTION AND 1997 RECOMMENDATION 14, at http:/ /www.oecd.org/pdf/M00007000/ 
M00007838.pdf (last visited Nov. 8, 2002) [hereinafter MEXICO CouNTRY REPORT]. 
63See ORGANISATION FOR EcoNOMIC Co-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, AUSTRALIA: 
REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONVENTION AND 1997 RECOMMENDATION 13-14, at 
http:/ /www.oecd.org/pdf/M00007000/M00007713.pdf (last visited Nov. 8, 2002) [herein-
after AUSTRALIA COUNTRY REPORT); ORGANISATION FOR EcoNOMIC CO-OPERATION AND 
DEVELOPMENT, CANADA: REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONVENTION AND 1997 
RECOMMENDATION 15, at http:/ /www.oecd.org/pdf/M00007000/M00007826.pdf (last 
visited Nov. 8, 2002) [hereinafter CANADA CoUNTRY REPORT); ORGANISATION FOR Eco-
NOMIC Co-oPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, UNITED KINGDOM: REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION 
OF THE CONVENTION AND 1997 RECOMMENDATION 15, at http:/ /www.oecd.org/pdf/ 
M00013000/M00013351.pdf (last visited Nov. 8, 2002) [hereinafter U.K. CouNTRY RE-
PORT]. 
64 See DENMARK COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 61, at 27. The statute of limitations for 
natural persons in Denmark is five years. The Working Group recommended that the stat-
ute of limitations for legal persons should be equivalent to the statute of limitations for 
natural persons. 
65 See id. at 27. 
66 See FRANCE COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 61, at 31; DENMARK COUNTRY REPORT, su-
pra note 61, at 27. 
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analysis. For instance, it will be difficult for the Working Group to de-
termine whether statutes of limitations of varying lengths have 
achieved a functional equivalence in their application because most 
Phase 2 evaluations will take place only four to six years after the Con-
vention entered into force in particular countries, making it likely 
that a large number of offenses will not yet have been prosecuted.67 
Rather than relying on an ill-timed attempt to determine whether 
statutes of limitations of varying lengths have achieved functional 
equivalence, it may be wiser for the Working Group to survey the sig-
natory countries' implementing legislation and find an acceptable, 
but concrete, minimum length requirement for all statutes of limita-
tions. In fact, a majority of countries have adopted a five-year statute 
of limitations, pointing to a strong consensus among signatory coun-
tries that a statute of limitations of no less than five years is an ade-
quate period of time for the investigation and prosecution of bribery 
offenses.68 Moreover, the adoption of a minimum five-year statute of 
limitations requirement is not only consistent with the Convention's 
"functional equivalence" principle, 69 but also does not require fun-
damental changes in any states' legal system.70 
B. Adopting Minimum Sanctions for the Punishment of 
Natural and Legal Persons 
Another area in which the Convention would benefit from a 
clearer standard is the sanctioning of natural and legal persons. Arti-
cle 2 of the Convention requires that parties establish liability of legal 
67 The Working Group has called for Phase 2 evaluations of all participants to be com-
pleted by 2005. See PHASE 2, supra note 36. However, the Convention's entry into force 
varies by country from February 15, 1999 (Canada, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, 
the United Kingdom and the United States) to August 24, 2001 (New Zealand). See 
Ratification Status, supra note 54. 
68 Of the twenty-eight countries evaluated by November 13, 2001, nineteen have 
adopted a statute of limitations of at least five years and three countries have no statute of 
limitations. See ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC Co-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, CouN-
TRY REPORTS ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONVENTION, at http:/ /www.oecd.org/ 
oecd/ pages/home/ displaygeneral/ 0,3380,EN-documen t-88-nodirectorate-no-3-16889-
31,FF.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2002) [hereinafter CoUNTRY REPORTS ON THE IMPLEMENTA-
TION OF THE CoNVENTION]. In fact, Iceland increased the statute of limitations where the 
offense only subjects the offender to fines (which generally applies to legal persons) from 
two years to five years following the Working Group's examination. ORGANISATION FOR 
ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, ICELAND: REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION OF 
THE CONVENTION AND 1997 RECOMMENDATION 20 & n.6, at http:/ /www.oecd.org/pdf/ 
M00007000/M00007834.pdf (last visited Nov. 8, 2002). 
69 See OECD Convention, supra note 2, at cmts. para. 2. 
70 See id. 
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persons for the bribery of a foreign public official but, in the event 
that criminal liability is not applicable to legal persons under the 
party's legal system, the party is not required to establish such crimi-
nal responsibility.71 The Working Group has noted that a number of 
countries have passed sanctions that vary a great deal from one an-
other and that these disparities should be monitored through the 
Phase 2 evaluations.72 For instance, several countries, including Aus-
tria, Mexico, The Slovak Republic, Spain, and Sweden, enacted rela-
tively weak sanctions for legal persons committing bribery offenses. 73 
Most of these countries enacted sanctions that call for less than three 
years of imprisonment and/or a relatively small fine. 74 In fact, Swe-
den's maximum term of imprisonment for bribing a foreign public 
official is two years; Mexico's maximum fine for the same offense is 
$1,800 USD.75 At the other end of this spectrum are a number of 
countries that have enacted comparatively strong punishments for 
natural persons convicted of bribing a foreign public official. Luxem-
bourg, for example, imprisons bribery offenders for between five and 
fifteen years while the United States imposes a fine of up to $100,000 
USD.76 
71 See id. at art. 2 & cmts. para. 20. 
72 See IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONVENTION, supra note 56, at 8. 
73 See ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, AUSTRIA: RE-
VIEW OF IMPLEMENTA'IlON OF THE CONVENTION AND 1997 RECOMMENDATION 9, at 
http:/ /www.oecd.org/pdf/M00007000/M00007769.pdf (last visited Nov. 8, 2002) [herein-
after AUSTRIA CoUNTRY REPORT); MEXICO COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 62, at 8; SLOVAK 
REPUBLIC CouNTRY REPORT, supra note 61, at 8; 0RGANISA'I10N FOR EcoNOMIC Co-
OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, SPAIN: REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONVENTION 
AND 1997 REcoMMENDATION 9, at http:/ /www.oecd.org/pdf/M00007000/M00007842.pdf 
(last visited Nov. 8, 2002) [hereinafter SPAIN CouNTRY REPoRT]; ORGANISATION FOR Eco-
NOMIC Co-oPERA'IlON AND DEVELOPMENT, SWEDEN: REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 
CONVENTION AND 1997 RECOMMENDATION 8, at http:/ /www.oecd.org/pdf/M00007000/ 
M00007844.pdf (last visited Nov. 8, 2002) [hereinafter SwEDEN CouNTRY REPORT]. 
74 See AusTRIA CouNTRY REPORT, supra note 73, at 9; MExico CouNTRY REPORT, supra 
note 62, at 8; SLOVAK REPUBLIC COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 61, at 8; SPAIN COUNTRY 
REPORT, supra note 73, at 9; SWEDEN CouNTRY REPORT, supra note 73, at 8. 
75 See SWEDEN COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 73, at 8; MEXICO CoUNTRY REPORT, supra 
note 62, at 8. 
76 See ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, LUXEM-
BOURG: REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONVEN'IlON AND 1997 RECOMMENDATION 13, 
at http:/ /www.oecd.org/pdf/M00007000/M00007208.pdf (last visited Nov. 8, 2002); OR-
GANISATION FOR EcoNOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, UNITED STATES: REVIEW 
OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONVENTION AND 1997 RECOMMENDATION 11, at 
http:/ /www.oecd.org/pdf/M00007000/M00007849.pdf (last visited Nov. 8, 2002) [herein-
after U.S. CouNTRY REPORT]. 
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The Phase 1 evaluations have also uncovered a number of prob-
lems with the sanctioning of legal persons. 77 Japan, for instance, was 
cited by the Working Group as adopting fines for legal persons that 
may not be sufficiently "effective, proportionate and dissuasive. "78 
While Japan provides for fines up to 300 million yen (approximately 
$2.7 million USD), the Working Group felt that these sanctions were 
not proportionate to the massive size of many large Japanese compa-
nies.79 Yet, the Working Group found Australia's sanctions for legal 
persons acceptable although they only call for a maximum fine of 
$330,000 Australian Dollars (AUD) (approximately $175,000 USD).80 
The broad range of sanctions enacted by signatory countries is 
particularly problematic because the standard set by the Convention 
is itself amorphous and provides minimal guidance.81 Article 3 merely 
provides that bribery by natural or legal persons be punishable by "ef-
fective, proportionate and dissuasive" penalties comparable to those 
applicable to the bribery of the country's own public officials.82 In the 
case of natural persons, penalties must include the deprivation of lib-
erty sufficient to enable effective mutual legal assistance and extradi-
tion.83 This is a difficult standard to measure because it provides no 
point of reference for determining whether measures enacted by sig-
natory countries satisfY the Convention's minimum requirements.84 
And, even assuming all in the broad range of sanctions and penalties 
adopted by the signatory countries do prove to be sufficiently "effec-
tive, proportionate and dissuasive," the wide variance of penalties im-
posed for similar offenses contradicts one of the Convention's main 
goals: achieving functional equivalence among the measures taken by 
signatory countries.s5 
77 See, e.g., SLOVAK REPUBLIC CouNTRY REPORT, supra note 61, at 23; CANADA CoUNTRY 
REPORT, supra note 63, at 24. 
78 See JAPAN CouNTRY REPORT, supra note 62, at 26; OECD Convention, supra note 2, 
art. 3. 
79 See jAPAN CouNTRY REPoRT, supra note 62, at 26. 
80 See AusTRALIA CouNTRY REPORT, supra note 63, at 10, 24. Australian authorities 
have noted that a conviction for bribery would disqualify the company from a number of 
business activities (e.g .• casinos, broadcasting). AusTRALIA CoUNTRY REPORT, supra note 
63, at 24. 
81 SeeOECD Convention, supra note 2, at art. 3, para. 1. 
B2 Id. 
83 ld. 
84 See id. at art. 3. In addition, the Commentaries on the OECD Convention provide lit-
tle additional guidance. See OECD Convention, supra note 2, at cmts., paras. 21-24. 
85 See OECD Convention, supra note 2, at cmts. para. 2. 
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However, a standard-less approach was not acceptable to the 
Working Group who, in their review of Canada, expressed concern 
that Canada's failure to establish either minimum or maximum fines 
for either natural or legal persons may make the sanctions in-
sufficiently dissuasive.86 Thus, not only do the current provisions of 
the Convention fail to adequately define what sanctions are consid-
ered "effective, proportionate and dissuasive," but the Working Group 
has been critical of countries who have left the provision to judicial 
interpretation. 87 
In addition to requiring that sanctions be effective, proportionate 
and dissuasive, the Convention or its Commentaries should include 
minimum standards for punishing both natural and legal persons. For 
instance, the Working Group has suggested that a maximum three-
year term of imprisonment may be too weak a punishment for natural 
persons convicted of bribery.88 The maximum five-year term of im-
prisonment adopted by Korea, Switzerland, and the U.S. is the short-
est maximum standard meeting the approval of the Working Group 
and should be adopted as the minimum standard for signatory coun-
tries.89 Although twelve signatory countries currently fall below this 
standard,90 several countries have already recognized the need to in-
crease their maximum term of imprisonment to at least five years in 
order to meet the requirements of the Convention.91 Since monetary 
fines are generally imposed in addition to imprisonment, and because 
the level of the fines is closely related to the relative economic pros-
86 See CANADA COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 63, at 24. 
87 See id. 
88 See DENMARK COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 61, at 26. 
89 See ORGANISATION FOR EcoNOMic Co-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, KoREA: RE-
VIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION OF TilE CONVENTION AND 1997 REcoMMENDATION 9, at 
http:/ /www.oecd.org/pdf/M00007000/M00007837.pdf (last visited Nov. 8, 2002); OR-
GANISATION FOR ECONOMIC Co-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, SWITZERLAND: REVIEW OF 
IMPLEMENTATION OF TilE CoNVENTION AND 1997 REcoMMENDATION 8, at http:/ I 
www.oecd.org/pdf/M00007000/M00007846.pdf (last visited Nov. 8, 2002); U.S. CouNTRY 
REPORT, supra note 76, at 11. 
90 The twelve signatory countries having less than a five-year maximum term of im-
prisonment for natural persons convicted of bribery are Austria, Bulgaria, Denmark, Fin-
land, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Norway, Slovak Republic, Spain, and Sweden. See 
COUNTRY REPORTS ON TilE IMPLEMENTATION OF TilE CONVENTION, supra note 68. 
91 See, e.g., ORGANISATION FOR EcoNOMIC Co-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, NoRWAY: 
REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION OF TilE CONVENTION AND 1997 REcoMMENDATION 6, at 
http:/ /www.oecd.org/pdf/M00007000/M00007839.pdf (last visited Nov. 8, 2002) [herein-
after NoRWAY CouNTRY REPORT]. 
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perity of the signatory nation,92 the level of monetary sanctions im-
posed on natural persons could safely be left to the discretion of the 
signatory countries so as not to require fundamental changes to coun-
tries' legal systems.93 
Finally, for legal persons convicted of bribery, the Convention 
should require that signatory countries could impose a fine of at least 
$175,000 USD. Again, this is the smallest maximum fine meeting the 
approval of the Working Group in their Phase I country evaluations.94 
While this amount is relatively low compared with several countries 
that may impose fines of greater than $2 million USD, twelve coun-
tries do not currently meet this proposed standard.95 In addition, 
countries remain free to supplement fines with civil· and administra-
tive sanctions.96 This proposed standard strikes a balance between the 
Convention's two chief aims: it improves the likelihood that the 
measures adopted by signatory countries will be functionally equiva-
lent without requiring fundamental changes to countries' legal sys-
tems, which might be the case if specific administrative sanctions were 
required.97 
Once standard, minimum sanctions for legal and natural persons 
are established, Phase 2 evaluations will be useful in determining 
whether signatory countries have enacted provisions that are truly 
functionally equivalent. However, without standard, minimum sanc-
tions, signatory countries will invariably punish similar offenses with 
materially different sanctions, thwarting the Convention's functional 
equivalence cornerstone. 
CoNCLUSION 
Bribery is an expensive and injurious problem that properly de-
mands comprehensive, worldwide attention. While a number of or-
92 See, e.g., MEXICO COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 62, at 8; U.S. CouNTRY REPORT, supra 
note 76, at 11. 
93 See OECD Convention, supra note 2, at cmts., para. 2. 
94 See, e.g., AusTRALIA CouNTRY REPORT, supra note 63, at 10. In addition, many coun-
tries have left fines to the discretion of their judicial system. See, e.g., CANADA CouNTRY 
REPORT, supra note 63, at 9; NORWAY COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 91, at 6. 
95 See, e.g., JAPAN CouNTRY REPORT, supra note 63, at 9; U.S. CouNTRY REPORT, supra 
note 76, at 11. Countries currently not meeting this standard include Argentina, Austria, 
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, Slovak Repub-
lic, Spain, and Switzerland. See CouNTRY REPORTS oN 'IHE IMPLEMENTATION OF 'IHE CoN-
VENTION, supra note 68. 
96 See OECD Convention, supra note 2, at art. 3. 
97 See id. at cmts. para. 2. 
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ganizations have attempted to combat this problem, the OECD's Con-
vention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in Interna-
tional Business Transactions is the most comprehensive attempt to 
curb the effects of international bribery. Though the current Conven-
tion is a strong first step toward achieving functional equivalence be-
tween the measures adopted by the Convention's signatory countries, 
more precise standards should be adopted for the statute of limita-
tions and sanction requirements in order to ensure the uniform im-
plementation of the Convention. The Convention's signatory parties 
should: adopt a minimum five-year statute of limitations requirement, 
adopt a five-year maximum term of imprisonment for natural persons 
convicted of bribery, and impose a fine of not less than $175,000 usn 
for individuals convicted of bribery. These amendments to the Con-
vention will aid the consistent application of the Convention's princi-
ples and promote functional equivalency between the measures en-
acted by signatory countries, without requiring perfect uniformity or 
fundamental changes in parties' legal systems. 
